EL Clasico post-Franco :
Since the days of Franco, the relationship between Real Madrid and Barcelona has been extremely hard to define. We cannot just call it a rivalry, as it would be a gross understatement of the passion and hatred shared by each football club for the other. Being the top two teams in Spain, they have been in direct confrontation for almost every major title over the last 60 years.
Although they are very similar in their performance, goals and ambitions, both football clubs are vastly different when it boils down to tradition and history. Madrid has been known to live by an extremely efficient business standpoint, where revenues and profits are equally important as champagne football and silverware. On the other hand, Barcelona has a very unique style and identity, based around nurturing and developing young players into world greats. Although this philosophy can be dated back to the 1960’s, it was the Johan Cryuff era in which Barcelona went from strength to strength, with young teams predominantly composed of youth teamers. This is obvious when we look at the current team coached by Pep Guardiola. The system seems like one of total football adopted and perfected by Johan Cryuff in the 90’s when he led Barca to a whole host of silverware.
Although both football clubs go into the season looking to win every title that they enter in, there is no greater glory than victory over the other in the El Clasico. In fact, even if either club won the League, or Champions League, but got trounced in the Clasico, the season would not be deemed as a great success. There would still be a dark cloud over the loser of this great battle, since bragging rights mean so much to the fans of each team.
Some of the greatest, most hotly contested, and intriguing games in the world of football have been in El Clasico. For instance, tensions were inflamed in 1995 when Barcelona was crushed 5-0 at the Bernabeu Stadium, as Zamarano’s first half hat-trick helped Real Madrid play Barcelona off the pitch.
However, not even that stood up to Barcelona’s 6-2 drubbing of Real at the end of the 2009 season. Even though Barca played this match between legs of their Champions League semifinal, they ran riot in the Spanish capital through goals from Henry, Messi, Puyol, and Pique. From there, Madrid went on to lose their next five league games, while Barcelona won the first major treble of trophies in Spain’s history. Clearly, the passions from the 1950s have not subsided, even though politically the games are no longer as significant.
The Cruyff Years :
Johan Cruyff was one of the most influential players in the history of this feud of soccer lore known as El Clasico. In 1973, Ajax transferred Johan Cruyff to Barcelona for a world record £922,300. With his transfer happening a few games after the start of a so-far abysmal season, many hoped Cruyff would revive Barcelona’s chances of winning the league. Lo and behold, Cruyff not only helped Barcelona work its way back to contention, but also helped the club win its first La Liga championship since 1960, very infamously humiliating Real Madrid 5-0 in the Bernabeu in the process.
Joining the blaugranas just two years before the death of Francisco Franco, Johan Cruyff very visibly ushered in a new era of El Clasico, one that starkly contrasted from the Franco era. In fact, one of the very reasons he chose the Catalonian team as his second club was because it represented the opposition to Franco’s dictatorship in Spain.
With his completely new style of play, now known as “Total Football,” Cruyff did not just change El Clasico and Barcelona, but the entire game itself. This fluid, almost circular, style of play has transformed positional football, changing the typical football formation from a 4-2-4 to a 4-2-2. This style of play focused on constant movement, on players constantly moving and maintaining possession. “Total Football” is all about constantly finding different pockets of space to work with. Instead of standing in one general location like past football players used to, Total Footballers are required to run to the open space, to move up or back to play different positions, based on what they deem appropriate and strategic for the success of the team.
In 1988, Cruyff returned to Catalan as a manager. This era of Cruyff management is considered one of the greatest eras of FC Barcelona. Cruyff’s Dream Team in the early to mid 1990s won four league titles, as well as Barcelona’s first ever European Cup victory. Furthermore, Cruyff was fantastically notorious for developing fantastic players like Koeman, Romario, and Guardiola, Cruyff’s captain, who would inevitably follow in his footsteps as Barcelona manager and lead the club to multiple La Liga titles and Champions League titles. In this way, Cruyff, in one way or another, accounts for many of the trophies and mere achievements in Barcelona’s history.
On top of all of this, Cruyff also revolutionized the entire concept of youth development, putting unbelievable emphasis on Barcelona’s youth academy and setting up the club very well for the future. As one soccer historian puts it, “Cruyff was its coach, the head coach of the entire club from the academy up.”
Although he might not have had an unbelievable impact on El Clasico as a player, outside of the 1973 season, what Cruyff did as a manager, as a youth developer, and as a tactical genius, for Barcelona, has paved the way not only for some unbelievable eras of recent Barcelona football, but also for the recent era of global dominance that has seen Barcelona emerge as arguably the greatest club team of a generation and, potentially, of all time.
The Legend of La Quinta del Buitre :
In between Di Stefano’s legendary team and Zidane’s Galacticos, one Real Madrid team left its marks as one of the most entertaining, enjoyable generations of madridismo football: La Quinta del Buitre. The term Quinta del Buitre, in English the Buitre’s generation, was used for the first time in a sports article in El Pais. Written by Julio Cesar Iglesias, the article, “Amancio y La Quinta del Buitre,” the article made the first reference of this legendary generation and focused on five players in particular. The five players were: Emilio Butragueno, El Buitre, the leader of the generation, and a fantastic central forward; Manolo Sanchis, an intelligent central back in an era of rough and tough central backs; Michel, a hot-blooded winger and the only member of the Quinta to win a Champions League title with Real Madrid; Rafael Martin Vasquez, the most underrated player and the most technically gifted player of the La Quinta generation; and Miguel Padreza, the black sheep of the generation and a classy striker. Overall, the generation was marked by a
great theme of classiness off the field and exciting play on the field.
Although this generation marked the end of Di Stefano’s managerial tenure at Real Madrid, La Quinta del Bruite still managed to win 5 La Liga titles from 1984 to 1991. Without any significant foreign players, the Quinta generation was loved my the madridistas for its homegrown players and very organic success.
After the 1989-1990 season of La Liga, the 1990-1991 season marked a change of the cycle, evident from the start of that year. The departure of Martin Vazquez that year was very symbolic and left a gaping hole on this Real Madrid team. With Vazquez gone and many players growing older and older, the door was open for Cruyff’s Dream Team to swoop in and take control of La Liga. During the following three years, in fact, Barca built their legendary status.
Despite this overpowering by Cruyff’s Barcelona team, La Quinta del Bruite will always serve as a proud example of home grown Spanish players exerting total dominance on Spanish football, an achievement that Barcelona could never replicate, until about 30 years later.
Media as Influence Today :
Ever since the emergence of the media in Spain, football has become more than just a game played on a grass pitch. In fact, media has had a huge influence on the global spread of the beautiful game. The media is often used as a tool to connect millions of people with the sport, and helps spread information on events on and off the football pitch.
Sometimes different section of the media can become associated with or biased towards a particular team. This has been the case in Spain for many decades. The national dailies Marca and AS in Madrid, and Sport in Barcelona have been used as a vehicle to promote the interests of their respective football teams. Ever since the famous Di Stéfano saga, these rival newspapers have locked horns and provided a vast array of controversial information to feed the begging public.
What happened in those days is no different now. In the last few years we have seen many instances of these newspapers spreading and increasing the bad blood between Barcelona and Real Madrid. Whether it is sport declaring the greatness of Barca and Catalonia, or Marca and AS advocating the dominance of Los Blancos, these dailies have pushed the El Clasico rivalry to new heights. With very different strategies employed in each area, both sides of the media agree on their dislike for the other.
These days the media has the power to cause so much turmoil in the football world. When it was 2005 and Madrid had not won a title for 3 consecutive years, it was Sport that took a swipe at the Spanish capital and Florentino Perez’s “galactico” policy. On the other hand, when Ronaldinho was caught partying night after night, Marca and AS were on deck to stir the waters and topple the Barca ship that had won the double the year before.
Even in transfers the media plays a huge role. Over the past few summers Real Madrid and Barca have been linked to a whole host of players. Granted they have a massive attraction effect on these world stars, but sometimes we get the feeling as if these are players that the respective newspapers want in each team. By unsettling players such as Cristiano Ronaldo and Zlatan Ibrahimovic, the media was able to hasten the process by which these world stars move to Spain. Overall they play a huge effect in promoting the ideologies of their respective teams, but also are ever present in publishing all the dirt on the other. This influence has really taken the rivalry to new heights.
Luís Figo as Catalyst :
Luís Figo is an enduring icon in Portuguese football. As a member of the “golden generation” that won U-20 World Youth Championships in 1989 and 1991, he had always been marked for greatness. He succeeded in winning European Footballer of the Year in 2000, FIFA World Footballer of the Year in 2001, and six consecutive Portuguese Footballer of the Year awards from 1995-2000. Finally, Figo extended his legacy by becoming the only member of his storied generation to extend his career in order to compete on the 2006 World Cup team, which he captained to a semi-final defeat to France. Yet, as much as Figo has done for Portuguese football, he has arguable done even more to fuel the rivalry between FC Barcelona and Real Madrid.
Luís Figo, though playing for Barça for only a short time, was an adored cult hero, and “an icon of barcelonismo.” Maturing under the colors of Catalonia, he became one the worlds greatest footballers while playing for FC Barcelona. Despite his Portuguese heritage, and the fact that FC Barcelona had bought him only a few years earlier after a dispute between Italian clubs Juventus and Parma made him available, Figo had been intrinsically woven into the identity of the Barcelona team, as defined, and promulgated, by their fans (particularly Barca’s Ultras, the Boixos Nois). In July 2000, Barcelona fans were devastated to hear that Figo had been bought for a then-world-record fee of $56 million,When they learned who he was bought by, archrival Real Madrid, devastation turned to seething anger, the depths of which soccer has rarely known. Figo’s move to FC Barça’s mortal enemy constituted, “a special type of transgression of player-club loyalty,”one which could, and would, never be forgiven.
Figo would make his first appearance back in Camp Nou, now playing for the opposition, three months after his transfer, on October 22, 2000. The headline of Marca, a leading football periodical in Barcelona published a picture of Figo’s ear, with the headline, “Figo: Te Van a calentar la oreja (Figo, they’re going to make your ears burn).”Which is precisely what they did, asthe fans abused him so loudly on every corner kick that his performance ultimately suffered. However this would be just a preview of what was to come, as the Catalonians’s anger would not subside, and only grew with time
Over two years after his ignominious transfer, in November 2002, during the “ ‘Derbi de la Vergüenza’ (Derby of Shame),” Figo was met by an even angrier crowd. During this match, when Figo went to take a corner kick, the Boxois Nois, a neo-fascist ultra fan group, threw “the head of a suckling pig and a full bottle of whisky” at him.
EL Clasico post-Franco :
Since the days of Franco, the relationship between Real Madrid and Barcelona has been extremely hard to define. We cannot just call it a rivalry, as it would be a gross understatement of the passion and hatred shared by each football club for the other. Being the top two teams in Spain, they have been in direct confrontation for almost every major title over the last 60 years.
Although they are very similar in their performance, goals and ambitions, both football clubs are vastly different when it boils down to tradition and history. Madrid has been known to live by an extremely efficient business standpoint, where revenues and profits are equally important as champagne football and silverware. On the other hand, Barcelona has a very unique style and identity, based around nurturing and developing young players into world greats. Although this philosophy can be dated back to the 1960’s, it was the Johan Cryuff era in which Barcelona went from strength to strength, with young teams predominantly composed of youth teamers. This is obvious when we look at the current team coached by Pep Guardiola. The system seems like one of total football adopted and perfected by Johan Cryuff in the 90’s when he led Barca to a whole host of silverware.
Although both football clubs go into the season looking to win every title that they enter in, there is no greater glory than victory over the other in the El Clasico. In fact, even if either club won the League, or Champions League, but got trounced in the Clasico, the season would not be deemed as a great success. There would still be a dark cloud over the loser of this great battle, since bragging rights mean so much to the fans of each team.
Some of the greatest, most hotly contested, and intriguing games in the world of football have been in El Clasico. For instance, tensions were inflamed in 1995 when Barcelona was crushed 5-0 at the Bernabeu Stadium, as Zamarano’s first half hat-trick helped Real Madrid play Barcelona off the pitch.
However, not even that stood up to Barcelona’s 6-2 drubbing of Real at the end of the 2009 season. Even though Barca played this match between legs of their Champions League semifinal, they ran riot in the Spanish capital through goals from Henry, Messi, Puyol, and Pique. From there, Madrid went on to lose their next five league games, while Barcelona won the first major treble of trophies in Spain’s history. Clearly, the passions from the 1950s have not subsided, even though politically the games are no longer as significant.
The Cruyff Years :
Johan Cruyff was one of the most influential players in the history of this feud of soccer lore known as El Clasico. In 1973, Ajax transferred Johan Cruyff to Barcelona for a world record £922,300. With his transfer happening a few games after the start of a so-far abysmal season, many hoped Cruyff would revive Barcelona’s chances of winning the league. Lo and behold, Cruyff not only helped Barcelona work its way back to contention, but also helped the club win its first La Liga championship since 1960, very infamously humiliating Real Madrid 5-0 in the Bernabeu in the process.
Joining the blaugranas just two years before the death of Francisco Franco, Johan Cruyff very visibly ushered in a new era of El Clasico, one that starkly contrasted from the Franco era. In fact, one of the very reasons he chose the Catalonian team as his second club was because it represented the opposition to Franco’s dictatorship in Spain.
With his completely new style of play, now known as “Total Football,” Cruyff did not just change El Clasico and Barcelona, but the entire game itself. This fluid, almost circular, style of play has transformed positional football, changing the typical football formation from a 4-2-4 to a 4-2-2. This style of play focused on constant movement, on players constantly moving and maintaining possession. “Total Football” is all about constantly finding different pockets of space to work with. Instead of standing in one general location like past football players used to, Total Footballers are required to run to the open space, to move up or back to play different positions, based on what they deem appropriate and strategic for the success of the team.
In 1988, Cruyff returned to Catalan as a manager. This era of Cruyff management is considered one of the greatest eras of FC Barcelona. Cruyff’s Dream Team in the early to mid 1990s won four league titles, as well as Barcelona’s first ever European Cup victory. Furthermore, Cruyff was fantastically notorious for developing fantastic players like Koeman, Romario, and Guardiola, Cruyff’s captain, who would inevitably follow in his footsteps as Barcelona manager and lead the club to multiple La Liga titles and Champions League titles. In this way, Cruyff, in one way or another, accounts for many of the trophies and mere achievements in Barcelona’s history.
On top of all of this, Cruyff also revolutionized the entire concept of youth development, putting unbelievable emphasis on Barcelona’s youth academy and setting up the club very well for the future. As one soccer historian puts it, “Cruyff was its coach, the head coach of the entire club from the academy up.”
Although he might not have had an unbelievable impact on El Clasico as a player, outside of the 1973 season, what Cruyff did as a manager, as a youth developer, and as a tactical genius, for Barcelona, has paved the way not only for some unbelievable eras of recent Barcelona football, but also for the recent era of global dominance that has seen Barcelona emerge as arguably the greatest club team of a generation and, potentially, of all time.
The Legend of La Quinta del Buitre :
In between Di Stefano’s legendary team and Zidane’s Galacticos, one Real Madrid team left its marks as one of the most entertaining, enjoyable generations of madridismo football: La Quinta del Buitre. The term Quinta del Buitre, in English the Buitre’s generation, was used for the first time in a sports article in El Pais. Written by Julio Cesar Iglesias, the article, “Amancio y La Quinta del Buitre,” the article made the first reference of this legendary generation and focused on five players in particular. The five players were: Emilio Butragueno, El Buitre, the leader of the generation, and a fantastic central forward; Manolo Sanchis, an intelligent central back in an era of rough and tough central backs; Michel, a hot-blooded winger and the only member of the Quinta to win a Champions League title with Real Madrid; Rafael Martin Vasquez, the most underrated player and the most technically gifted player of the La Quinta generation; and Miguel Padreza, the black sheep of the generation and a classy striker. Overall, the generation was marked by a great theme of classiness off the field and exciting play on the field.
Although this generation marked the end of Di Stefano’s managerial tenure at Real Madrid, La Quinta del Bruite still managed to win 5 La Liga titles from 1984 to 1991. Without any significant foreign players, the Quinta generation was loved my the madridistas for its homegrown players and very organic success.
After the 1989-1990 season of La Liga, the 1990-1991 season marked a change of the cycle, evident from the start of that year. The departure of Martin Vazquez that year was very symbolic and left a gaping hole on this Real Madrid team. With Vazquez gone and many players growing older and older, the door was open for Cruyff’s Dream Team to swoop in and take control of La Liga. During the following three years, in fact, Barca built their legendary status.
Despite this overpowering by Cruyff’s Barcelona team, La Quinta del Bruite will always serve as a proud example of home grown Spanish players exerting total dominance on Spanish football, an achievement that Barcelona could never replicate, until about 30 years later.
Media as Influence Today :
Ever since the emergence of the media in Spain, football has become more than just a game played on a grass pitch. In fact, media has had a huge influence on the global spread of the beautiful game. The media is often used as a tool to connect millions of people with the sport, and helps spread information on events on and off the football pitch.
Sometimes different section of the media can become associated with or biased towards a particular team. This has been the case in Spain for many decades. The national dailies Marca and AS in Madrid, and Sport in Barcelona have been used as a vehicle to promote the interests of their respective football teams. Ever since the famous Di Stéfano saga, these rival newspapers have locked horns and provided a vast array of controversial information to feed the begging public.
What happened in those days is no different now. In the last few years we have seen many instances of these newspapers spreading and increasing the bad blood between Barcelona and Real Madrid. Whether it is sport declaring the greatness of Barca and Catalonia, or Marca and AS advocating the dominance of Los Blancos, these dailies have pushed the El Clasico rivalry to new heights. With very different strategies employed in each area, both sides of the media agree on their dislike for the other.
These days the media has the power to cause so much turmoil in the football world. When it was 2005 and Madrid had not won a title for 3 consecutive years, it was Sport that took a swipe at the Spanish capital and Florentino Perez’s “galactico” policy. On the other hand, when Ronaldinho was caught partying night after night, Marca and AS were on deck to stir the waters and topple the Barca ship that had won the double the year before.
Even in transfers the media plays a huge role. Over the past few summers Real Madrid and Barca have been linked to a whole host of players. Granted they have a massive attraction effect on these world stars, but sometimes we get the feeling as if these are players that the respective newspapers want in each team. By unsettling players such as Cristiano Ronaldo and Zlatan Ibrahimovic, the media was able to hasten the process by which these world stars move to Spain. Overall they play a huge effect in promoting the ideologies of their respective teams, but also are ever present in publishing all the dirt on the other. This influence has really taken the rivalry to new heights.
Luís Figo as Catalyst :
Luís Figo is an enduring icon in Portuguese football. As a member of the “golden generation” that won U-20 World Youth Championships in 1989 and 1991, he had always been marked for greatness. He succeeded in winning European Footballer of the Year in 2000, FIFA World Footballer of the Year in 2001, and six consecutive Portuguese Footballer of the Year awards from 1995-2000. Finally, Figo extended his legacy by becoming the only member of his storied generation to extend his career in order to compete on the 2006 World Cup team, which he captained to a semi-final defeat to France. Yet, as much as Figo has done for Portuguese football, he has arguable done even more to fuel the rivalry between FC Barcelona and Real Madrid.
Luís Figo, though playing for Barça for only a short time, was an adored cult hero, and “an icon of barcelonismo.” Maturing under the colors of Catalonia, he became one the worlds greatest footballers while playing for FC Barcelona. Despite his Portuguese heritage, and the fact that FC Barcelona had bought him only a few years earlier after a dispute between Italian clubs Juventus and Parma made him available, Figo had been intrinsically woven into the identity of the Barcelona team, as defined, and promulgated, by their fans (particularly Barca’s Ultras, the Boixos Nois). In July 2000, Barcelona fans were devastated to hear that Figo had been bought for a then-world-record fee of $56 million,When they learned who he was bought by, archrival Real Madrid, devastation turned to seething anger, the depths of which soccer has rarely known. Figo’s move to FC Barça’s mortal enemy constituted, “a special type of transgression of player-club loyalty,”one which could, and would, never be forgiven.
Figo would make his first appearance back in Camp Nou, now playing for the opposition, three months after his transfer, on October 22, 2000. The headline of Marca, a leading football periodical in Barcelona published a picture of Figo’s ear, with the headline, “Figo: Te Van a calentar la oreja (Figo, they’re going to make your ears burn).”Which is precisely what they did, asthe fans abused him so loudly on every corner kick that his performance ultimately suffered. However this would be just a preview of what was to come, as the Catalonians’s anger would not subside, and only grew with time
Over two years after his ignominious transfer, in November 2002, during the “ ‘Derbi de la Vergüenza’ (Derby of Shame),” Figo was met by an even angrier crowd. During this match, when Figo went to take a corner kick, the Boxois Nois, a neo-fascist ultra fan group, threw “the head of a suckling pig and a full bottle of whisky” at him.
Pre-Franco History :
It is unfortunate, but perhaps not surprising, that most narratives of El Clásico ignore the rivalry’s early history. Certainly, today’s heated animosity results from Spain’s Falangist era, but the roots of competition are ingrained in Spanish culture. Doubling as a history of both Spain and its soccer, Phil Ball’s Morbo asserts that regional rivalry has always existed within the whole of Spain, thanks to historic centralization policies of Spanish government. As he notes, “Madrid was built on and sustained by the notion of centralization”, physically at Spain’s direct center. The city’s location was purely based on such centrist symbolism, as Madrid “has no harbour, it is not at the meeting place of two rivers, it boils in summer and it freezes in winter.”
As a result, regional rivalries were natural at the very foundation of most Spanish clubs. Nothing illustrates this better than one of the very first meetings between the two clubs, at a mini-tournament in 1902. Held to commemorate the crowning of Alfonso XIII, the tournament featured two clubs each from Madrid and Barcelona, as well as Basque club Vizcaya.Barcelona beat Madrid FC (Real’s name at the time) in the opening match, 3-1, and fell to Vizcaya in the final, 2-1. However, the story finds its political significance in the “third-place match”, hastily arranged once tournament organizers became upset that a tournament for a new Castilian monarch was being largely contested by Basques and Catalans. A trophy was even conjured and widely publicized by the media, even though as Ball puts it, “it must have been something hastily brought along from somebody’s personal silver collection”.
Such shared hostility remained and grew as the teams continued to play each other over the next decade or so. These contests were mostly dominated by Catalans, to the tune of repeated and poor-spirited complaints from the direction of the Castillans. Overall, “the strife and struggles between the two clubs from 1905 onwards accurately mirror the main contests of 20th century Spanish history… mainly through clear cultural differences.” If such differences in 1905 were the logs at the base of the fire, the ensuing political mayhem of General Franco’s reign ignited them into full blaze.
General Franco :
In 1939, the end of the Spanish Civil War saw the Nationalist forces of General Francisco Franco take control of the country. After capturing Madrid on March 28th to end the War, El Generalísimo sought to unify the newly formed Spanish state. He frequently used policies of murder, torture and political pressure to suppress any anti-Nationalist sentiment. Separatist causes in previously autonomous regions were most troublesome for him, and since Catalonia had fought Franco’s centrist policies very bitterly, the region became a source of particular ire for him.
At the same time, football had become an important means of cultural expression. Therefore, Franco began to use football as a propaganda tool for the new regime. He sought to disrupt the operations of Barcelona, a symbol of Catalonian pride, while supporting Real Madrid, Barcelona’s archrival from the capital city. Franco had no real passion for the game , but wished to use Real Madrid as a vehicle of the Falangist state.
History presents many examples of Franco’s systematic interventions in Spanish football. For instance, in order to enforce the strict prohibition of regional languages, Franco demanded that the name of the club be translated from the CatalanFC Barcelona its Spanish equivalent, Barcelona CF.Symbolically, such a change was a cultural indication that Catalan society was not to be tolerated by the new Spanish State.
The story of the 1943 semifinals of the Generalísimo’s Cup (formerly the King’s Cup) more directly relates to the game of football. Barcelona were seemingly in control after the first leg, which they had comfortably won 3-0 at home.However, upon visiting the capital they were surprised by a visit from the director of state security. Supposedly, he reminded the players of the State’s fortunate generosity at letting them remain in the country, and thus implicitly threatened them.The players took the hint, and lost 11-1. Though much of Franco’ support remains shrouded in some mystery, there is no doubt that such support existed and boosted the fortuned the Castillan club.
The Di-Stéfano signing :
Perhaps nothing epitomized the backroom politics of the Franco regime better than the protracted battle between Barcelona and Real Madrid for the signature of Alfredo di Stéfano.
In the constant arms race to dominate Spanish football, both teams became interested in Di Stéfano after his dazzling performances for Millonarios captivated Spain during a friendly tournament in Madrid.Barcelona reacted quickest, and through Catalan lawyer Ramon Trias Fargas, they easily reached a transfer agreement with River Plate, who was still di Stéfano’s official employer according to FIFA.
However, this agreement was conditional on the consent of Millonarios. Franco therefore sought to disrupt Barcelona’s advances through Barcelona’s “chief scout” Josep Samitier, a notorious playboy who Franco frequently bribed with favors elevating his lifestyle.At Franco’s indirect suggestion, Samitier entrusted the Millonarios side of the deal with Joan Busquets, a director of Millonarios’ Colombian rivals Santa Fe. Busquets deliberately lowballed the negotiations with his rivals, allowing Real Madrid to reach an agreement with the Colombians.For his part, Barcelona’s president Marti Carretó did quite little to control the matter, leading to suggestions by Trias Fargas that Carretó too was a “government stooge”.
Of course, Franco did not control FIFA, who ignored the unsanctioned Colombian league and approved Barcelona’s deal, even allowing di Stéfano to play for Barcelona in two friendlies. He did, however, control the State. When Barcelona were near to a deal, the Spanish government passed a law outlawing the purchase of foreign players, putting control of the matter once again in Franco’s hands.[vi] Demonstrating the farcical nature of its new law, the State then brokered a deal itself, whereby di Stéfano would alternate yearly between the two clubs.
Carretó surprisingly capitulated to the agreement, perhaps explained by the claims that he operated under the orders of El Generalísimo. However, he soon resigned under intense pressure from the entirety of Catalonia, which disapproved of any deal linking their club with Franco’s Nationalist ideologies.The interim board of directors then handed di Stéfano’s full rights over to Real, in exchange for a repayment of the sum originally paid to River Plate. “The Blond Arrow” would go on to score 216 goals for los merengues in his illustrious career, winning them eight league titles and five consecutive European Cups among other awards.
As a whole, the saga of Alfredo di Stéfano’s signing is symbolic of Franco’s authoritarian power, and it provides a microcosm of his methods. Franco built much of his primary power by using backroom politics to cement total control of the State. In buying off figures like Samitier with the State’s money and patronage, Franco created a vast network of allies. This network was strengthened by tying the futures of those individuals to his own position as controller of the State, proven by Samitier’s continuing friendship with Real’s president Santiago Bernabeu.
Furthermore, by threatening visible figures such as Carretó, El Generalísimo flexed the State’s muscle to demonstrate his control over those in high positions. When individual ties were irrelevant (such as after FIFA’s ruling), Franco’s control over the Cortes, the legislative body, still allowed him to control Spanish affairs. Essentially, Franco had totally internalized any external influences on his politics.
It seems that in sum, Franco created a cycle that fed on its own activity to consolidate control over the entire nation. As he personally gained influence with Spain’s powerful elite, so the power of the State grew. This, in turn, allowed him to influence more and more people and institutions. Eventually, such activity reached the bounds of its expansion, uniting everyone who he could buy off or coerce, and suppressing the uncompromising ideologues, such as Catalan nationalists. However, because Franco was the one who exerted such influence, it was the man himself, rather than his position, that remained central to this system of patronage and coercion. The Spanish State’s survival until his death, combined with its collapse immediately afterward, prove as much.
Di Stéfano’s international legacy is an oft-unexplored wrinkle to this story, as he shone a positive light on the Spanish State when he turned out for the Spanish national team. Like at Real Madrid, Franco sought to project a glorious image of Spain to its citizens through the team. To this end, he nationalized the world’s best players in order to ensure victory, including the Czech Kubala and Hungarian superstar Ferenc Puskas. Di Stéfano was naturalized in 1956 despite having previously represented both Argentina and Colombia.
Di Stéfano’s impressive performances in 31 caps led to 23 goals for Spain, leading many to believe that he would have been the country’s all-time leading scorer, had he started playing for Spain earlier. Bizarrely though, the world never had a chance to ever admire “The Blond Arrow” on the biggest stage. Argentina didn’t enter the World Cup in 1950 or 1954, Spain didn’t qualify in 1958, and di Stéfano withdrew due to injury from Spain’s ill-fated 1962 campaign.
In fact, none of the naturalized players ever played in a World Cup, but Franco nevertheless achieved his goal when Spain hosted and won the 1964 European Championship with a Spanish-born side. True to form, the Spanish press drew parallels to the Nationalists’ triumph over its major enemy, Communism, with overtones that El Generalísimo’s regime had saved the country as a whole.Franco had again succeeded in using football to convey a specific positive image of the Spanish State, an image he worked to uphold continually until his death in 1975. As for di Stéfano, the Argentina native is considered Spanish, and he was named Spain’s “Golden Player” of the last 50 years at UEFA’s Jubilee.
Pre-Franco History :
It is unfortunate, but perhaps not surprising, that most narratives of El Clásico ignore the rivalry’s early history. Certainly, today’s heated animosity results from Spain’s Falangist era, but the roots of competition are ingrained in Spanish culture. Doubling as a history of both Spain and its soccer, Phil Ball’s Morbo asserts that regional rivalry has always existed within the whole of Spain, thanks to historic centralization policies of Spanish government. As he notes, “Madrid was built on and sustained by the notion of centralization”, physically at Spain’s direct center. The city’s location was purely based on such centrist symbolism, as Madrid “has no harbour, it is not at the meeting place of two rivers, it boils in summer and it freezes in winter.”
As a result, regional rivalries were natural at the very foundation of most Spanish clubs. Nothing illustrates this better than one of the very first meetings between the two clubs, at a mini-tournament in 1902. Held to commemorate the crowning of Alfonso XIII, the tournament featured two clubs each from Madrid and Barcelona, as well as Basque club Vizcaya.Barcelona beat Madrid FC (Real’s name at the time) in the opening match, 3-1, and fell to Vizcaya in the final, 2-1. However, the story finds its political significance in the “third-place match”, hastily arranged once tournament organizers became upset that a tournament for a new Castilian monarch was being largely contested by Basques and Catalans. A trophy was even conjured and widely publicized by the media, even though as Ball puts it, “it must have been something hastily brought along from somebody’s personal silver collection”.
Such shared hostility remained and grew as the teams continued to play each other over the next decade or so. These contests were mostly dominated by Catalans, to the tune of repeated and poor-spirited complaints from the direction of the Castillans. Overall, “the strife and struggles between the two clubs from 1905 onwards accurately mirror the main contests of 20th century Spanish history… mainly through clear cultural differences.” If such differences in 1905 were the logs at the base of the fire, the ensuing political mayhem of General Franco’s reign ignited them into full blaze.
General Franco :
In 1939, the end of the Spanish Civil War saw the Nationalist forces of General Francisco Franco take control of the country. After capturing Madrid on March 28th to end the War, El Generalísimo sought to unify the newly formed Spanish state. He frequently used policies of murder, torture and political pressure to suppress any anti-Nationalist sentiment. Separatist causes in previously autonomous regions were most troublesome for him, and since Catalonia had fought Franco’s centrist policies very bitterly, the region became a source of particular ire for him.
At the same time, football had become an important means of cultural expression. Therefore, Franco began to use football as a propaganda tool for the new regime. He sought to disrupt the operations of Barcelona, a symbol of Catalonian pride, while supporting Real Madrid, Barcelona’s archrival from the capital city. Franco had no real passion for the game , but wished to use Real Madrid as a vehicle of the Falangist state.
History presents many examples of Franco’s systematic interventions in Spanish football. For instance, in order to enforce the strict prohibition of regional languages, Franco demanded that the name of the club be translated from the CatalanFC Barcelona its Spanish equivalent, Barcelona CF.Symbolically, such a change was a cultural indication that Catalan society was not to be tolerated by the new Spanish State.
The story of the 1943 semifinals of the Generalísimo’s Cup (formerly the King’s Cup) more directly relates to the game of football. Barcelona were seemingly in control after the first leg, which they had comfortably won 3-0 at home.However, upon visiting the capital they were surprised by a visit from the director of state security. Supposedly, he reminded the players of the State’s fortunate generosity at letting them remain in the country, and thus implicitly threatened them.The players took the hint, and lost 11-1. Though much of Franco’ support remains shrouded in some mystery, there is no doubt that such support existed and boosted the fortuned the Castillan club.
The Di-Stéfano signing :
Perhaps nothing epitomized the backroom politics of the Franco regime better than the protracted battle between Barcelona and Real Madrid for the signature of Alfredo di Stéfano.
In the constant arms race to dominate Spanish football, both teams became interested in Di Stéfano after his dazzling performances for Millonarios captivated Spain during a friendly tournament in Madrid.Barcelona reacted quickest, and through Catalan lawyer Ramon Trias Fargas, they easily reached a transfer agreement with River Plate, who was still di Stéfano’s official employer according to FIFA.
However, this agreement was conditional on the consent of Millonarios. Franco therefore sought to disrupt Barcelona’s advances through Barcelona’s “chief scout” Josep Samitier, a notorious playboy who Franco frequently bribed with favors elevating his lifestyle.At Franco’s indirect suggestion, Samitier entrusted the Millonarios side of the deal with Joan Busquets, a director of Millonarios’ Colombian rivals Santa Fe. Busquets deliberately lowballed the negotiations with his rivals, allowing Real Madrid to reach an agreement with the Colombians.For his part, Barcelona’s president Marti Carretó did quite little to control the matter, leading to suggestions by Trias Fargas that Carretó too was a “government stooge”.
Of course, Franco did not control FIFA, who ignored the unsanctioned Colombian league and approved Barcelona’s deal, even allowing di Stéfano to play for Barcelona in two friendlies. He did, however, control the State. When Barcelona were near to a deal, the Spanish government passed a law outlawing the purchase of foreign players, putting control of the matter once again in Franco’s hands.[vi] Demonstrating the farcical nature of its new law, the State then brokered a deal itself, whereby di Stéfano would alternate yearly between the two clubs.
Carretó surprisingly capitulated to the agreement, perhaps explained by the claims that he operated under the orders of El Generalísimo. However, he soon resigned under intense pressure from the entirety of Catalonia, which disapproved of any deal linking their club with Franco’s Nationalist ideologies.The interim board of directors then handed di Stéfano’s full rights over to Real, in exchange for a repayment of the sum originally paid to River Plate. “The Blond Arrow” would go on to score 216 goals for los merengues in his illustrious career, winning them eight league titles and five consecutive European Cups among other awards.
As a whole, the saga of Alfredo di Stéfano’s signing is symbolic of Franco’s authoritarian power, and it provides a microcosm of his methods. Franco built much of his primary power by using backroom politics to cement total control of the State. In buying off figures like Samitier with the State’s money and patronage, Franco created a vast network of allies. This network was strengthened by tying the futures of those individuals to his own position as controller of the State, proven by Samitier’s continuing friendship with Real’s president Santiago Bernabeu.
Furthermore, by threatening visible figures such as Carretó, El Generalísimo flexed the State’s muscle to demonstrate his control over those in high positions. When individual ties were irrelevant (such as after FIFA’s ruling), Franco’s control over the Cortes, the legislative body, still allowed him to control Spanish affairs. Essentially, Franco had totally internalized any external influences on his politics.
It seems that in sum, Franco created a cycle that fed on its own activity to consolidate control over the entire nation. As he personally gained influence with Spain’s powerful elite, so the power of the State grew. This, in turn, allowed him to influence more and more people and institutions. Eventually, such activity reached the bounds of its expansion, uniting everyone who he could buy off or coerce, and suppressing the uncompromising ideologues, such as Catalan nationalists. However, because Franco was the one who exerted such influence, it was the man himself, rather than his position, that remained central to this system of patronage and coercion. The Spanish State’s survival until his death, combined with its collapse immediately afterward, prove as much.
Di Stéfano’s international legacy is an oft-unexplored wrinkle to this story, as he shone a positive light on the Spanish State when he turned out for the Spanish national team. Like at Real Madrid, Franco sought to project a glorious image of Spain to its citizens through the team. To this end, he nationalized the world’s best players in order to ensure victory, including the Czech Kubala and Hungarian superstar Ferenc Puskas. Di Stéfano was naturalized in 1956 despite having previously represented both Argentina and Colombia.
Di Stéfano’s impressive performances in 31 caps led to 23 goals for Spain, leading many to believe that he would have been the country’s all-time leading scorer, had he started playing for Spain earlier. Bizarrely though, the world never had a chance to ever admire “The Blond Arrow” on the biggest stage. Argentina didn’t enter the World Cup in 1950 or 1954, Spain didn’t qualify in 1958, and di Stéfano withdrew due to injury from Spain’s ill-fated 1962 campaign.
In fact, none of the naturalized players ever played in a World Cup, but Franco nevertheless achieved his goal when Spain hosted and won the 1964 European Championship with a Spanish-born side. True to form, the Spanish press drew parallels to the Nationalists’ triumph over its major enemy, Communism, with overtones that El Generalísimo’s regime had saved the country as a whole.Franco had again succeeded in using football to convey a specific positive image of the Spanish State, an image he worked to uphold continually until his death in 1975. As for di Stéfano, the Argentina native is considered Spanish, and he was named Spain’s “Golden Player” of the last 50 years at UEFA’s Jubilee.